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 5 
Abstract 6 
The possibility of ensuring the energy needed by a country is a fundamental requirement for the economic growth and 7 
social welfare of that country. The fulfillment of this need is particularly challenging for those countries that are 8 
characterized by a low level of energy self-sufficiency. The evaluation of energy security needs to consider different 9 
dimensions and is of the utmost importance as a benchmark to conceive and implement different policies. The 10 
assessment of the level of security should rely on science-based models that are able to track the rapidly evolving 11 
geopolitical scenarios, and to provide detailed information and quantitative indexes to policy decision makers. In this 12 
paper, an overarching methodology is outlined to evaluate energy security, in which its external and internal dimensions 13 
are considered and integrated: the security of the energy supply from abroad (external) and the security of national 14 
energy infrastructures (internal). Attention is then focused on the external dimension, and two indexes are defined, by 15 
means of a probabilistic approach, in terms of the expected value of supply and economic impacts. The methodology is 16 
then applied to the Italian case, considering different geopolitical scenarios, and conclusions are provided about the  17 
energy security of the country. 18 
 19 
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1. INTRODUCTION 20 
Energy security is a crucial issue for each and every country. It may be defined as the capability of  ensuring the 21 
availability of different typologies of energy for the final uses, in the needed quantity, where  requested, over  short, mid 22 
and long time horizons. It is necessary to ensure access to the commodity sources, their transportation (using suitable 23 
corridors) to the country, the possible transformation into secondary commodities and its distribution inside the country 24 
itself, by means of appropriate infrastructures. 25 
It should be underlined that – in general terms – the energy security of a country depends not only on the possibility of 26 
obtaining the needed amount of energy commodities by means of local production or by importing from abroad (supply 27 
side), but also on the flexibility in the end-use demand (demand side). 28 
In countries characterised by a low self-sufficiency, such as Italy (24.1% in 2014), the security issues related to the 29 
acquisition of energy commodities, depending on geopolitical scenarios, is particularly critical. At the EU28 level, the 30 
energy self-sufficiency is about 46.5%. At the same time, the security of the internal transport/distribution of energy, 31 
related to the  National infrastructures, is also relevant. 32 
Thus, the evaluation of the level of energy risk, at a given point in time, and its evolution over a short time horizon, by 33 
means of science-based approaches, are crucial to define and improve defence and mitigation countermeasures. Instead, 34 
in the mid-long term, the analysis of the risk related to possible alternative scenarios allows strategical planning to be 35 
made in terms of new sources and new intra-national and infra-national infrastructures. 36 
For these reasons,  a methodological approach is proposed in this paper to assess, in a comprehensive way, the security 37 
of a country, through a quantification of the energy security, which is able to capture supply risks and provide the basis 38 
of a cost-benefit analysis. 39 
The methodological contribution of this work is represented by the adaptation of the classical risk analysis approach, 40 
used in studies of industrial technologies and plants, to the analysis of the security of energy supply in a geopolitical 41 
perspective, and by the coupling of  this new approach with  a detailed characterisation of the energy corridors, which, 42 
in this way, makes it possible to take into account their spatial dimension and to embed it in the mathematical 43 
relationships defined to  evaluate  the risk parameter. 44 
The risk indexes related to the single corridors and the overall national supply risk (both physical – in terms of energy 45 
losses – and economic) can thus be used to help support decision makers in assessing and ranking the criticalities of the 46 
energy system  and in performing comparative scenario analyses of different strategical options that involve energy 47 
imports and infrastructures. 48 
The relevance of the proposed approach, which  links technical, geopolitical and economic  considerations, lies in the 49 
fact that the energy supply of a country is affected by several aspects (economy, geopolitical relationships and security) 50 
that interact with each other and which need to be investigated in an integrated perspective. In particular, on one hand, 51 
the geopolitical situation can have a significant influence on the energy commodity costs, thus having an impact on  the 52 
economy, and on the other can determine the county’s level of energy supply security and have effects on the supply 53 
availability, which – in turn – again affects  the economy. 54 
The developed methodology is here illustrated with reference to the Italian situation. 55 
The paper is structured as follows. The state of the art, related to the geopolitical risk indicators, is summarised in sec.2;  56 
the adopted methodological approach is described in sec.3;  the results of an application to a case study, related to the 57 
energy supply to Italy, is presented in sec 4. 58 
 59 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW OF ENERGY SECURITY INDICATORS 60 
Over the last decade, the evaluation of the security and affordability of the energy supply has played an increasing role, 61 
and has been one of the main issues for policy makers, especially in high energy import dependent countries, like many 62 
of the European Union Member States, including Italy. 63 
Several approaches have been proposed to quantify the level of security of supply to a country, most of which are  64 
based on the definition of numerical risk parameters that are able to take into account geopolitical aspects and/or 65 
country-dependent energy indicators.  Kruyt et al. [1] performed a classification of some of the main energy indexes by 66 
distinguishing between ten simple indicators (including import dependency, reserve-to-production ratio and energy 67 
prices) and five aggregated indexes (i.e. the Oil Vulnerability Index (OVI), the Willingness to Pay Index, the IEA 68 
Energy Security Index (ESI), the Supply-Demand Index and the Shannon Index). 69 
Referring to these five indexes, Gupta [2] evaluated an overall oil vulnerability index (OVI) that depends on the 70 
combination of seven indicators, related to oil supply and consumption and to the economic level of the receiving 71 
country (GDP per capita, oil import dependency, oil consumption per GDP unit). Bollen [3] based his study on a cost-72 
benefit analysis, and this led to the definition of a “Willingness to Pay” function that measures the percentage of GDP 73 
that the analysed country is willing to pay in order to decrease its risk. IEA ESI [4] evaluated the effects of the supply 74 
market concentration on energy commodity prices, taking into account the geopolitical risk rating of the supply 75 
countries. Scheeepers et al. [5,6] analysed the Supply-Demand Index, defined on the basis of experts’ judgement by 76 
means of scoring rules, and focused on the whole energy chain (including conversion, transport, supply and demand of 77 
energy in the mid-long term). The Shannon-Wiennier Index (SWI) [7], which quantifies diversification by taking into 78 
account the share of each commodity in the fuel mix composition, is also used to evaluate energy security. 79 
Martchamadol et al. [8] performed an analysis of the state of the art, in which several indicators were taken into 80 
 National energy security assessment in a geopolitical perspective – pg 3/15 
account. Among these indicators, the following can be mentioned: the WEC Assessment Index (AI) [9], which 81 
evaluates energy security by means of five indicators (including net energy imports and diversification of the energy 82 
supply); the WEC Energy Sustainability Country Index (ESCI) [10], which is based on 22 indicators, including oil 83 
reserves, stock and energy security; the APERC study [11], which considers five indicators (such as the net import 84 
dependency, the net oil import dependency and the oil import dependency from Middle Eastern countries); the 85 
UNDESA Energy Indicators for Sustainable Development [12]; the Global Network on Energy for Sustainable 86 
Development (GNESD) indicator [13]. They also developed a new composite index, the Aggregated Energy Security 87 
Performance Indicator (AESPI) [8], which ranges  between 0 (low security) and 10 (high security), and which is built  88 
using 25 indicators. These indicators are evaluated on the basis of the historical data series of the population, the GDP, 89 
the energy production, the net import and consumption, the power generation capacity, the transformation and 90 
transmission losses, and the  coal, crude oil and natural gas emission factor values. 91 
Most of the energy risk indicators are assumed steady over time. Apart from the above mentioned AESPI index, only a 92 
few other indexes, such as the Supply-Demand Index defined by Scheepers et al. and the Composite Indicator 93 
developed by Badea et al. [14], have taken  into consideration a forecasted time evolution. These indicators were both 94 
based on energy projections from the PRIMES model, and are used by the European Commission to evaluate the EU 95 
Trends up to 2030 [15]. The study by Checchi et al. [16] also focused on the long-term evaluation of the security of 96 
energy supply, referring to the results of the PRIMES model, but it did not set any index to quantify this evaluation. 97 
Among the indicators based on time series analyses, the International Index of Energy Security Risk (IIESR), set up by 98 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for 21st Century Energy [17], allows  the security level of 25  large consuming 99 
countries throughout the world to be compared on a yearly basis. This approach refers to the identification of eight 100 
index categories (including reserves and the production of oil, natural gas and coal, and energy imports). A set of 29 101 
metrics was defined for each of these categories. The 1980-2012 time horizon was taken into account for all of the 102 
metrics; moreover, each of these metrics was normalised  with reference  to the 1980 OECD value. The normalised 103 
metrics were then weighted, using the International Weightings Index, which gives the percentage contribution of each 104 
category to the total, in order to calculate the overall IIESR value. Sovacool [18] defined an indicator for the evaluation 105 
of the energy security of a country, referring to the European Union, the United States, China, India, Japan, South 106 
Korea, Australia, New Zeeland and ten countries belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 107 
For this purpose, five fundamental dimensions of  energy security were identified (availability, reliability, technological 108 
development, sustainability and regulations). In turn, these dimensions were subdivided into 20 components, each of 109 
which was related to a metric. Frondel et al. [19,20,21] proposed and implemented a methodology aimed at classifying 110 
countries (in particular those belonging to the G7) on the basis of the risk level related to the primary energy commodity  111 
supply in the mid-long term; the authors defined, for each commodity, a risk indicator expressed as a function of the 112 
probability of commodity flow disruption for the various exporting countries, and  of the square value of the percentage 113 
contribution given by each exporting country and by the local production to the energy demand fulfilment in the 114 
analysed country. In turn, the supply unavailability for a certain country was evaluated on the basis of considerations 115 
associated with the geopolitical situation and economic stability, while the share values for the exporting countries were 116 
correlated to the Herfindahl index [22], which measures the import concentration for a specific commodity. 117 
Guivarch et al. [23] analysed the possible evolution of energy security in Europe from a decarbonisation perspective, by 118 
taking into account the time evolution of a set of indicators (based on the concepts of resilience, robustness and 119 
sovereignty) in the case of different scenarios. A study focusing on the impacts of alternative climate mitigation policy 120 
scenarios on South Korea, Japan and China was instead performed by Matsumoto et al. [24] by means of a computable 121 
general equilibrium model. 122 
Valdés Lucas et al. [25] explored, over a long-term time horizon, the correlation between the deployment of renewables 123 
and energy security, considering several indicators related to three energy policy dimensions: competitiveness, security 124 
of supply and environment. 125 
Biresselioglu et al. [26] considered  natural gas supply security and the evolution of different indicators (including the 126 
number of supply countries, the total volume of gas imported and the fragility of supply countries over the 2001-2013 127 
period in order to build a Supply Security Index (SSI) through an application of the Principal Component Analysis 128 
(PCA) technique. Another study – carried out by Flouri et al. [27] – focused on natural gas, and was devoted to 129 
exploring, using a Monte Carlo simulation approach, how a disruption in the natural gas supply from Algeria, for 130 
geopolitical reasons, could affect the natural gas supply security of the EU: this analysis in particular highlighted the 131 
relevant role played by the diversification of suppliers in increasing energy security. 132 
Kisel et al. [28] described the different methods and indicators that are adopted to assess energy security and to 133 
delineate energy policies, and they proposed an Energy Security Matrix that is able to organise the most significant 134 
indicators in a structured way from the point of view of operational and technical resilience, technical vulnerability, 135 
economic dependence and political affectability in different sectors. 136 
Among the other studies that have focused on the relevance of the geopolitical element in the evaluation of the risk 137 
related to the energy supply, those carried out by Correlje and van der Linde [29], Costantini et al. [30], Hedenus [31] 138 
and Umbach [32] can be mentioned. The FP-7 European project “Risk of Energy Availability: Common Corridors for 139 
Europe Supply Security” (REACCESS) [33] developed tools that can be used to conduct a quantitative assessment of 140 
the geopolitical risk for scenario analyses. In this project – characterized by the link between three forecasting TIMES-141 
based [34] optimisation energy models – a risk index (steady over time and ranging between 0 and 100) was defined for 142 
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all the commodity source countries and for all the countries crossed by the above mentioned corridors. This index is a 143 
function of the socio-political, energetic, political-institutional and economic security level of the country, and it was 144 
calculated by means of factor analysis techniques (Marín-Quemada et al. [35,36,37]). During the follow-up phase of the 145 
project, these indexes were combined, through an application of the reliability theory, in order to define a single risk 146 
index for each corridor; for this purpose, the risk index related to each crossed country was assumed as the probability 147 
that a corridor crossing that country would fail (Gerboni et al. [38]). Furthermore, starting from the same risk indexes 148 
per country, Doukas et al. [39] developed a web-based tool for the analysis of the natural gas and oil corridors, and they 149 
tested it by means of a case study focused on the Greek energy supply. Using the same approach (based on the factor 150 
analysis), Muñoz et al. [40] defined the country composite indicator GESRI (Geopolitical Energy Supply Risk Index), 151 
which – unlike the one proposed by Marín-Quemada et al. – combines the social and political dimensions in a single 152 
risk vector and introduces a new vector that describes the relations between the exporting and transit countries with the 153 
EU-27. Finally, in the framework of the REACCESS project, Carpignano et al. [41] proposed a methodological 154 
approach to evaluate the technological risk and the loss of production caused by corridor failures, and included these 155 
parameters among those used to analyse optimal scenarios for the EU energy supply. 156 
 157 
3. INDICATORS FOR NATIONAL ENERGY SECURITY ASSESSMENT 158 
The overall energy security of a country depends on two different “fronts”. The first is “internal” and is related to: a) the 159 
quantification of the highest or lowest availability of national resources for each considered primary energy commodity  160 
(natural gas, oil, coal); b) resilience to possible internal attacks against the infrastructures (distribution networks) or 161 
transformation plants (refineries, regasification terminals, etc.).  162 
The second is “external” and includes: a) the geopolitical security of the commodity source country; b) the security of 163 
the infrastructures up to the national entry point, taking into consideration the route of the energy corridors (open sea or 164 
captive) and the risk indexes associated with each crossed country; c) the possible effects on imports due to the 165 
unavailability (at different temporal scales) of the above mentioned infrastructures. 166 
A security index can be conceived for each of these “fronts”, and the combination of the two provides the overall 167 
assessment of the national security of the Country. 168 
The nomenclature of the main indexes and parameters is given in Table 2. Generally speaking, the internal risk can be 169 
expressed as a function of the resilience of the transmission/distribution infrastructure: 170 
 171 
𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑓(𝜗𝑐,𝑑) 
 172 
Assuming ϑc,d as the Resilience index, which is used to quantify the resilience of the internal distribution/transmission 173 
network dd for commodity cc. This index has been disregarded in this paper and attention has been focused on the 174 
external one. 175 
The proposed index for the external risk is a weighted function of the contribution given by the risk indexes associated 176 
with the source and crossed countries, and of the energy content of the commodity imported through each corridor. 177 
An index φk [0,100], which is mainly related to the geopolitical situation, has been associated to each country to 178 
quantify the criticality of that country; this index is estimated as described in sec. 2 and can continuously be tracked and 179 
updated over time. 180 
A corridor i is defined as: 181 
 182 
ii  𝒥 : ii = {cc, ll, 𝒦i} c=l=i,  183 
corridor ii  𝒥 is defined by a length li  ℒ, a commodity 𝒸i  𝒞i, a set of crossed countries 𝒦
 i
 with 𝓀ii  𝒦
i
, the 184 
country of origin, dim(𝒦i) = Ki the number of countries crossed. 185 
A risk index 𝜉’i is defined for each corridor ii and its probability of failure is identified [38]: 186 
 187 
𝜉𝑖
′ = 100 ∙ [1 − ∏ (1 −
𝜑𝑘
100
)
𝓀𝑖∈𝒦𝑖
] (1) 
 188 
In (1): 189 
 190 
(1 −
𝜑𝑘
100
) is the probability of success of crossing country k, 191 
∏ (1 −
𝜑𝑘
100
)𝓀𝑖∈𝒦𝑖  is the probability (of independent events) of success of crossing all the countries involved along 192 
the corridor route, 193 
1 − ∏ (1 −
𝜑𝑘
100
)𝓀𝑖∈𝒦𝒾  is the probability of failure for the entire corridor, and it is expressed as the complement of 194 
the probability of success. 195 
 196 
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Corridors are composed of different branches in different countries; each segment has a different length; a “spatial 197 
dimension” in the exposure to risk is assumed, in the sense that, given a φk index for a country, its contribution to the 198 
overall risk of the corridor would be proportional to the length of the segment of the corridor in that country. 199 
The total length li of corridor ii is given by the sum of the length of the branches of the corridor in the crossed countries: 200 
 201 
li = ǁB
iǁ1 202 
 203 
An empirical weighting function γk is introduced into (1) in order to incorporate this aspect:  204 
 205 
𝜉𝑖 = 100 ∙ [1 − ∏ (1 −
𝛾𝑘 ∙ 𝜑𝑘
100
)
𝓀𝑖∈𝒦𝑖
] (2) 
 206 
The assumed values of γk are reported in Tab. 1 as a function of the ratio between the real length of the corridor branch, 207 
bb, and the average length of the corridor branches ?̅?𝑖 (3). 208 
 209 
?̅?𝑖 =
𝑙𝑖
𝐾𝑖
 (3) 
 210 
Open sea routes and submarine pipelines, territorial waters and international waters are all involved in the risk 211 
assessment of the corridor. In order to avoid an underestimation of the risk related to maritime routes, in comparison to 212 
the one related to terrestrial corridors, a zone of influence is defined for each country, and a portion of the international 213 
waters is also covered, to which the same index φk as the country is provided. 214 
The risk, 𝑅𝑖, associated to corridor ii, is defined as the product between the probability of failure 𝜉𝑖  and the damage, in 215 
terms of loss of energy 𝐸𝑐,𝑖 , associated to a commodity cc: 216 
 217 
𝑅𝑖 = ∑
𝜉𝑖
100
∙ 𝐸𝑐,𝑖
𝒸𝑖∈𝒞𝑖
 (4) 
 218 
The overall external risk, for all the corridors supplying the given country, is:  219 
 220 
𝑅𝑒𝑥𝑡 = ∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝑖𝑖∈𝒥
 (5) 
 221 
As far as time granularity is concerned, the analyses can be carried out considering different time scales (year, quarter, 222 
months,..). A higher time discretization, such as a monthly analysis, would  allow specific criticalities, such as those  223 
related to the natural gas supply during winter months, to be highlighted. 224 
The risk in (5) can be converted into equivalent monetary units though the national energy intensity of the economy Q 225 
(TJ/G€), which is defined as the ratio between the gross internal energy consumption (TJ) and the Gross Domestic 226 
Product (GDP, G€): 227 
 228 
𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑚 =
𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑄
 (6) 
  
𝑅𝑒𝑥𝑡,𝑚 =
𝑅𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑄
 (7) 
 229 
This conversion is useful to evaluate the economic impact of the geopolitical energy risk, because a possible loss of 230 
energy, due to the unavailability of an energy supply, causes a loss of GDP [42]. 231 
The sum of the two indicators, weighted using two coefficients, w1 and w2, allows the National Energy Security Index 232 
Rn to be defined (Fig.1): 233 
 234 
𝑅𝑛 = 𝑤1 ∙ 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝑤2 ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑥𝑡  (8) 
 235 
where w1 and w2 are defined on the basis of the percentage import dependency 𝜒:  236 
 237 
𝑤1 = 1 − 𝜒 (9) 
  
𝑤2 = 𝜒 (10) 
 238 
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The above described methodology is able to highlight any possible criticalities related to the fulfilment of the national 239 
requirement in the case of geopolitical issues that affect the supply and/or the transport/distribution of energy to end-240 
users. 241 
Focusing on the external dimension of security, it is possible to define the “expected supply”. The probability of success 242 
(availability) of each corridor is: 243 
 244 
𝜔𝑖 = 100 ∙ [∏ (1 −
𝛾𝑘 ∙ 𝜑𝑘
100
)
𝓀𝑖∈𝒦𝑖
] (11) 
 245 
The expected supply value Si for corridor ii is the product of 𝜔i and the energy flow 𝐸𝑐,𝑖 of the commodity cc carried by 246 
the corridor: 247 
 248 
𝑆𝑖 = ∑
𝜔𝑖
100
∙ 𝐸𝑐,𝑖
𝒸𝑖∈𝒞𝑖
 (12) 
 249 
The total expected supply Sext (TJ) can be evaluated as: 250 
 251 
𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑡 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
𝑖𝑖∈𝒥
 (13) 
 252 
The expected supply corresponds to the difference between the total supply, in energy terms E, and the overall external 253 
risk Rext: 254 
 255 
𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸 − 𝑅𝑒𝑥𝑡  (14) 
 256 
The adopted approach assumes that the events are independent, and offers a conservative overestimation of the risk. 257 
 258 
Finally, it should be highlighted that the error analysis in the proposed modelling approach  on the main parameters 259 
(such as energy flows, or corridor branch lengths) is not particularly relevant in comparison with the need to  260 
understand whether a certain event could happen or not. The aim of the adopted procedure is to associate a certain 261 
probability value to the single countries, which is able to describe the likelihood that a certain supply corridor crossing 262 
them fails due to geopolitical reasons, and is not to perform forecasting analyses on unpredictable events. Naturally, 263 
disruptive geopolitical events can suddenly occur, and these could significantly modify the probability value of the 264 
countries. For this reason, sensitivity analyses on the country risk index parameter are useful to evaluate the effects of 265 
such events on the global energy risk. Furthermore, when defining sensitivity scenarios, it could be appropriate to 266 
consider that a geopolitical event in a certain country can also affect other countries in the same geographical area, and 267 
as a result in some cases the geopolitical risk level should be considered jointly, and in the same way modified for the 268 
whole set of countries belonging to the same area. This could be particularly relevant for zones like the Middle-East and 269 
North-Africa (some examples are those of the so-called “Arab Spring” and the penetration of terroristic groups in these 270 
areas). 271 
 272 
4. CASE STUDY: THE EXTERNAL SUPPLY TO ITALY 273 
4.1 Definition of the scenarios  274 
The proposed methodology has been applied to the security analysis of the Italian national energy supply. The 275 
contribution to the risk given by the internal component Rint has been neglected, and the analysis has only focused on 276 
the evaluation of the Rext parameter. 277 
A total of 263 corridors (pipelines, ships, railways, roads, power lines), carrying 6 commodities (coal, crude oil, refined 278 
petroleum products, natural gas, LNG, electricity) and accounting for 97.5% of the Italian energy inflows in 2014 have 279 
been considered [43,44]. Country risk indexes have been assumed on the basis of the FP-7 REACCESS ([35], [36], 280 
[37], [38]) project (Fig. 2, Tab. 3). 281 
 282 
Italian energy security has been assessed against five possible adverse scenarios. The scenarios are characterized by two 283 
different types of situation; in the first, the criticality of the country is increased due to a deterioration of the geopolitical 284 
situation in the area (modelled by an increase in the geopolitical country index), while in the second the situation, the 285 
country causes actions that provide the actual failure of a corridor.  286 
Five scenarios (S1-S5) have been taken into account (Tab. 4):  287 
S1) Increased activity of terroristic groups in North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia); 288 
S2) Deterioration of the Italian/Qatari diplomatic relations, with cuts in gas/oil exports to Italy; 289 
S3) Antagonistic actions in Libya with disruption of the Greenstream gas pipeline; 290 
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S4) Increase in the contrast between Russia and the Ukraine, with a country risk increase and disruption of the NG and 291 
oil corridors from Russia across the Ukraine; 292 
S5) The simultaneous occurrence of S1 and S4. 293 
 294 
4.2 Energy security analysis for different scenarios 295 
The impact of the considered scenarios has been assessed, considering the energy risk Ree and economic risk Rem values 296 
(Tab. 5) and they have been compared with the values related to the year 2014 (Reference situation, REF: 297 
corresponding to the actual configuration of flows, corridors and suppliers) with the Country indexes reported in Tab. 3.  298 
In Tab. 6, the indexes have been computed considering only the natural gas supply, which accounts for 33% of the 299 
Italian energy inflows in 2014. 300 
 301 
S1 shows an increase, of about 3%, in both Ree and Rem , mostly due to the large number of corridors (79, 30% of the 302 
total) that are affected by the increase in geopolitical risk in the four countries; their average risk index for corridor 𝜉 303 
increases by 17.6%, in comparison with the Reference, while the overall value of 𝜉 increases by 5.4%. 304 
In Tab. 7, the analysis is undertaken on a monthly time basis; both risk indexes, in this case, have a peak increase in 305 
September, due to an increase in the flow exported by the countries involved in S1, in comparison with the one exported 306 
by countries that do not undergo changes. An increase in the risk can be observed for S1 but, due to the absence of 307 
actual disruptions, the inflows are still there. 308 
 309 
S2 shows a criticality related to the LNG supply (the LNG supply from Qatar in 2014 was equal to 172.8 PJ/y). By 310 
setting the corridor risk to 100% (i.e. full unavailability and expected supply = 0) for all the Qatari corridors, the overall 311 
risk increases by 2.46%: this variation is due to the natural gas corridors (whose contribution to the total risk increases 312 
by 5.79%, in comparison with  the reference case). 313 
 314 
S3 shows an increase of 3.52% in the overall risk caused by the disruption of the Greenstream NG corridor (𝜉 = 100%). 315 
This unavailability has a relevant effect on the NG risk, which increases by 8.27%. Furthermore, the amount of energy 316 
lost in the case of a disruption of the Greenstream pipeline cannot be replaced by the same amount imported as LNG 317 
from the same supplier, because the only Libyan LNG terminal (i.e. the one located in Marsa al-Brega) is presently out 318 
of service and has been since 2011, as it was damaged during the civil war. 319 
 320 
S4 involves the whole Italian natural gas import from Russia (corresponding to 48.82% of the total natural gas import) 321 
and 3% of the crude oil import (one corridor). This situation has a particular impact on the overall risk, as it causes an 322 
increase of 8.68% (which reaches 16.33% for the risk contribution only related to the natural gas supply). This effect is 323 
prevalently due to the high level of import dependency on Russia: as a consequence, this can be a significant example of 324 
the importance of supply diversification (in terms of energy sources, supply countries and corridors), in order to avoid 325 
such criticalities and enhance the security level of a Country. 326 
 327 
S5 combines the effects of S1 and S4. This situation is extremely risky because it affects 46.1% of the total Italian 328 
energy supply, and it leads to a critical situation, especially for natural gas supply, as more than 70% of the imported 329 
flux is involved; the percentage of oil, RPP and coal imports involved is lower, but is significant, as it ranges between 330 
20% and 50%. The overall energy risk increases by 11.7%, above all due to the  specific risk contribution of natural gas 331 
(+20.4%). This relevant growth is justified by the fact that seven suppliers (Russia, the Ukraine, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, 332 
Tunisia and Nigeria) and 98 corridors undergo changes. In particular, the average 𝜉 increases by 17.5%, in comparison 333 
with the Reference case. 334 
 335 
4.3 Mitigation actions 336 
If a scenario leads to a loss of energy flow (S2-S5), specific countermeasures have to be planned and implemented to 337 
ensure the needed supply. Some of the possible mitigation options have been tested using the here presented model,  338 
their feasibility has been analysed and  their effects have been compared in terms of risk reduction, in comparison with 339 
the related scenario. For S2, the following options were considered: 340 
 341 
MA1-S2) Replacement of the Qatari LNG flow with a flow from Algeria (50%, Transmed pipeline;) and Russia (50%, 342 
TAG pipeline). 343 
This configuration – which is coherent with the maximum capacities at the national entry points – allows the needed 344 
annual quantity of natural gas to be ensured with a risk reduction of 1.21%, in comparison with S2. 345 
MA2-S2) Replacement of the Qatari LNG flow with a flow from Norway (25%, Transitgas pipeline), the Netherlands 346 
(25%, Transitgas pipeline) and Russia (50%, TAG pipeline). 347 
In this case, the reduction in the overall risk is lower than the one obtained from MA1-S2 (and equal to 2.10%), due to 348 
the low risk level of the two European countries. 349 
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MA3-S2) Replacement of the Qatari LNG flow with a flow from the UAE (100%, LNG to regasification terminals 350 
located near Panigaglia and Porto Levante). 351 
The resulting overall risk reduction is close to the one obtained for MA2-S2 (-2.39% vs. – 2.10%). The obtained 352 
configuration is similar to the reference one, due to the fact that the country indexes for Qatar (38.5) and the UAE 353 
(39.4), and the ship route to deliver LNG to Italy, are comparable. 354 
The effects of the mitigation actions are reported in Tab. 8. 355 
 356 
For S3, two mitigation actions were identified: 357 
 358 
MA1-S3) Replacement of the Libyan NG flow with a flow from Algeria (50%, Transmed pipeline) and Nigeria (50%: 359 
25% Transmed pipeline; 25% LNG). 360 
The risk reduces by 1.56%, in comparison with the S3 scenario. It should be noticed that the 𝜉 associated to these 361 
corridors is higher that the Greenstream one: this is not due to the source country indexes (as they are similar to the 362 
Libyan one for both Algeria and Nigeria), but – and particularly for Nigeria – to the high number of  countries that are 363 
crossed. 364 
MA2-S3) Replacement of the Libyan NG flow with a flow from the UAE (50%, LNG) and Qatar (50%, LNG). 365 
The resulting risk reduces by 3.49%. This option allows only maritime routes, which are more flexible and therefore  366 
more effective from the security point of view, to be used. 367 
The missing flow cannot be replaced entirely by European Countries (Norway and the Netherlands) as the required 368 
capacity is higher than the maximum one for the Transitgas corridor, which should be involved in this case. 369 
The effects of the mitigation actions are reported in Tab. 9. 370 
 371 
For S4, two mitigation options are defined: 372 
 373 
MA1-S4) Replacement of the Russian crude oil flow with a flow from Kazakhstan (50%) and Azerbaijan (50%); 374 
replacement of the Russian NG flow with a flow from Algeria (30%), Nigeria (30%), the Netherlands (10%), Norway 375 
(10%), Libya (7%), Qatar (7%) and the UAE (6%), i.e. from all the other countries that supply Italy, according to the 376 
maximum capacity of the pipelines. 377 
In this way, the overall risk decreases by 9.88%: this is mostly due to the decrease in the risk related to natural gas (-378 
21%). 379 
MA2-S4) Replacement of the Russian crude oil flow with a flow from the Russian corridors that do not cross the 380 
Ukraine; replacement of the Russian NG flows as in MA1-S4. 381 
The results show a reduction in the overall risk index of -10.08%, which is comparable with the one obtained in MA2-382 
S3. As in MA2-S3, this reduction is mostly related to the diversification of the NG supply. 383 
The possible evolution of the corridors can provide additional possibilities, in terms of mitigation effects. The supply 384 
from Russia through different corridors (whose routes do not cross the Ukraine), mainly depends on future strategies 385 
related to the possible new pipelines that could be built. One of these alternatives could be represented by the South 386 
Stream project, even though this solution does not currently seem feasible. In fact, the South Stream project (a pipeline 387 
of a total length of about 2380 km, of which 931 will be offshore through the Black Sea, from Russia to Bulgaria, with a 388 
capacity of 63 bcm/y) was declared, at the end of 2013, not to be compliant with the EU Third Energy Package 389 
regulations [45], which  introduced incompatibility between producers and TSOs (thus affecting the role played by the 390 
Russian natural gas production and distribution company Gazprom); furthermore, this decision has to be contextualized 391 
in a more general framework of geopolitical tensions between the EU and Russia, caused by the economic sanctions 392 
imposed after the Crimea crisis. After the declared abandon of the South Stream project by Russia, the alternative 393 
Turkish Stream (or TurkStream) project was proposed. This pipeline – originally expected to have the same capacity as 394 
the South Stream one – should run from Russia to Turkey and cross the Black Sea (with a subsea branch of about 900 395 
km) and to deliver 31.5 bcm/y; the construction is planned to start in 2017 and to be completed by 2019. According to 396 
the most recent information available, Russia could build an additional line to connect Turkey to Greece, thus allowing  397 
Europe to be supplied (15.75 bcm/y to Turkey, 15.75 bcm/y to Europe). Among all the possible options, an 398 
interconnection between the Turkish Stream and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) can be mentioned. The TAP 399 
pipeline infrastructure is presently under construction (with a length of 878 km, an initial capacity equal to 10 bcm/y 400 
and a planned maximum capacity of 20 bcm/y). It runs from Greece to Italy and will be connected to the Trans 401 
Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) – as part of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) – in order to carry natural gas from the 402 
Azeri field of Shah Deniz to Europe. The construction of the TAP pipeline, and in particular the possibility of linking it 403 
to the Turkish Stream, could be relevant for Italy, as this situation could allow it to become a European hub for natural 404 
gas imported from Azerbaijan and Russia. As far as the security point of view is concerned, in 2014 (the reference year 405 
of the case study), Italy’s overall natural gas import was equal to 55.78 bcm, of which 26.15 bcm came from Russia 406 
(46.9%). In the long term, hypothesising that the TAP pipeline could reach its maximum capacity, if the gas import 407 
remains constant, this corridor could impact on the supply for about 36%. By considering the latest data made available 408 
by the Italian Ministry of Economic Development and referring to 2015 [46], an increase in the overall imports can be 409 
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observed of up to 61.20 bcm; furthermore, if the historical trends are analysed, it can be noticed that the 2014 gas 410 
import value is significantly lower than the average import related to the last 12 years (69.27 bcm, with a peak of 77.40 411 
bcm in 2006). These observations, coupled with the constantly decreasing trend of local gas production (which 412 
accounted for 11.5% of the Gross Inland Consumption in 2014), have lead us to suppose that the import of natural gas 413 
in 2020 (the planned year for starting the TAP pipeline) could be higher than the present one. However, it can  414 
reasonably be expected that it will be lower than 80 bcm/y: in this case, the contribution of the TAP will range from 415 
12.5% (starting capacity = 10 bcm/y) to 25% (expansion up to the maximum capacity = 20 bcm/y). Focusing on the risk 416 
indexes (Tab. 3), it is possible to notice that the country risk index related to Azerbaijan is higher than that of Russia 417 
(43.9 vs. 34.0), and that the corridor route of the TAP pipeline (which crosses Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, Greece and 418 
Albania) cannot be considered “safer” than the TAG pipeline one (which crosses Russia, the Ukraine, Slovak and 419 
Austria). For these reasons, it is possible to conclude that the TAP corridor would probably not reduce the absolute 420 
value of the supply risk, but it could be useful to increase diversification of the supply, and it could also offer a relevant 421 
alternative that could help in the case of geopolitical tensions between Russia and the Ukraine. 422 
Other options, such as the use of the Yamal pipeline, cannot be considered, because of the constraint on the maximum 423 
capacity at the entry point, which is located in Passo Gries. 424 
The effects of the mitigation actions are reported in Tab. 10. 425 
 426 
For S5, flows from Russia and crossing the Ukraine (3 gas corridors and 1 oil corridor) have to be supplied in another 427 
way (as in S4), while this is not compulsory for those from North Africa (but could be recommended because of the 428 
high risk in comparison with the Reference scenario, due to hypothesised increase in the activity of terroristic groups). 429 
If the Russian flows are replaced in such a way as to avoid the North African corridors, it can be seen that several 430 
alternative options are available for oil import: ship transportation could be used (with the oil still coming from Russia) 431 
or the supplier could be changed (Caucasian countries, North and South America). As far as natural gas is concerned, if  432 
the supply from North African countries is avoided, only 60% of the flow that has to be replaced can be provided 433 
without overcoming the maximum capacity of the national entry points. As a consequence, with the current 434 
configuration of infrastructures, suppliers and corridors, the problem cannot be solved. In order to overcome this issue, 435 
some important changes have to be considered, including improvements of the infrastructures (new regasification plants 436 
or new pipelines) and the increase in the diversification of suppliers. 437 
 438 
The approach described in sec. 3 and the case study analysed in sec. 4 are proposed from a single country perspective. 439 
However, the methodology could be applied at different scales (country, region, macro-areas). In fact, it could be useful 440 
to explore the energy security issues, especially for developing countries like China or India (for example,   mention can 441 
be made to the studies performed by Jiang-Bo et al. [47] – which focus on the historical evolution of Chinese energy 442 
supply security,  considering four dimensions and seven indexes – and the one carried out by Bambawale et al. [48], 443 
which was based on the analysis of Indian energy security from different perspectives), which are characterised by a 444 
relevant energy consumption growth rate, and for countries that show a relevant import dependency. 445 
As far as  the latter  ones are concerned, Asian countries, like Japan and South Korea, can be mentioned. The overall 446 
Japanese  energy import dependency in 2014 was equal to 93.5%, with  relevant values for natural gas (97.6%) and 447 
crude oil (99.7%), while for South Korea, the import dependency in 2014 was equal to 82.8% (99.3% for natural gas 448 
and 99.5% for crude oil) [49]. Some European Countries are also  affected to a great extent by this issue [50]: among 449 
the most populated ones, the dependency level of Italy is significantly high, but  the situation of smaller countries, such 450 
as  the Baltic ones, should also  be highlighted, due to the fact that, since their independence and up to recent years, they  451 
have depended completely on a single supplier (Russia) [51]. 452 
 453 
5. CONCLUSIONS 454 
The proposed methodology (and the implemented tool) can provide a quantitative assessment of the energy security of a 455 
country in a geopolitical perspective. The methodology, implemented and tested with reference to the Italian case, has 456 
proved to be effective in supporting policy decision making in the short, mid and long term. 457 
This methodology allows a comprehensive representation of the inflow of a country, the assessment of its geopolitical 458 
risk and a cost benefit analysis, which is useful to compare different strategic options, to be obtained; a) in the short-459 
mid-term, to allocate efforts with the aim of protecting a given corridor b) in the mid/long term, to plan and activate 460 
new supply options and corridors. 461 
In addition, this methodology provides an effective way of designing mitigation countermeasures in the presence of an 462 
increase in the geopolitical risk or of adverse events, which could causing  a certain percentage of the needed supply to 463 
become unavailable; it allows their effectiveness to be compared, and the related economic impacts to be assessed in 464 
terms of reduction in GDP loss. 465 
With reference to the case of the Italian external supply, the analysis of the considered scenarios has highlighted the 466 
relevant role played by diversification in reducing the overall external risk. In a low self-sufficient country, the spatial 467 
dimension of energy corridors (the routes, lengths and the geopolitical security of the crossed countries) significantly 468 
affects the risk value. Moreover, in a strategic perspective, as natural gas is the most “risky” commodity, investments in 469 
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new LNG connections and terminals, or to increase the capacity of existing ones, could be beneficial from the security 470 
point of view. 471 
Investments in preventive actions against terroristic attacks against sensitive targets, such as pipelines, for example, the 472 
Greenstream corridor, could also lead to significant benefits from an economic point of view, as they could prevent the 473 
loss of a relevant amount of the GDP as the consequence of the sudden unavailability of an energy supply. 474 
The examined scenarios are related to the current energy system. From a more general perspective, the need to take into 475 
account climate changes, and to introduce adequate policies and countermeasures could have an effect on energy 476 
security [52] and lead to a new paradigm, based on a strong decarbonisation of the energy system and on the relevant 477 
role that renewables could play. According to this approach, among the future energy scenarios, the one that considers 478 
electrical UHV super-grids at a global scale, which would be able to transport electricity generated from renewable 479 
sources, such as wind and solar, from large production areas (the North Pole and African desert zones, respectively) to 480 
large consumption areas (such as the U.S.A., Asia and Europe), thus shifting the end-use energy consumptions from 481 
fossil fuels to cleanly produced electricity, can be mentioned [53]. Such a configuration could lead to an evolution in 482 
energy security, and could radically change the overall situation. The methodological approach described in this paper 483 
to evaluate supply security could also be adopted in future works to analyse these possible future scenarios and to 484 
compare them with other more traditional ones. 485 
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TABLES 604 
 605 
Table 1: Weighting function γk 606 
b
b
/?̅?𝒊 γk 
0-0.2 0.90 
0.2-0.5 0.93 
0.5-0.9 0.96 
0.9-1.1 1.00 
1.1-1.5 1.04 
1.5-2.0 1.07 
>2.0 1.10 
 607 
Table 2: Nomenclature 608 
Set / Parameter Description 
𝒞 = {…, cc, …}, dim(𝒞) = C Set of energy commodities 
𝒥 = {…, ii, …}, dim(𝒥) = I Set of energy corridors 
𝒞i  𝒞𝒸i  𝒞i Commodity delivered by corridor ii 
𝒦= {…, kk, …}, dim(𝒦) = K Set of countries (both source and corridor) 
𝒦i  𝒦𝓀ih  𝒦
i Country crossed by corridor ii 
ℒ = {…, ll,, …}, dim(ℒ) = L=I Set of corridor lengths (km) 
Bi= {…, bb,, …}, dim(B) = B
i, Set of the lengths of branches of corridor ii 
𝒟={…, dd,…}, dim(𝒟)=D Set of distribution / transmission infrastructures 
γk Geopolitical country index weight for Country k, 
depending on the length of each corridor branch 
𝜗c,d Resilience index for the internal distribution network 
d carrying commodity c 
𝜉i Risk index of corridor i 
φk Geopolitical country index for country k 
χ Import dependency (%) 
𝜔i Probability of success of corridor i 
Q Energy Intensity of the Economy 
w1 Weight coefficient for the internal risk 
w2 Weight coefficient for the external risk 
Ri Risk of corridor i 
Rint (ext) Overall internal (external) risk value 
Rint (ext),m Overall internal (external) risk, monetary units 
Si Expected supply of corridor i 
Sint (ext) Overall internal (external) expected supply 
E Total energy supply 
Ec,i Energy flow of commodity c carried by corridor i 
Rn National Energy Security Index 
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Table 3: Geopolitical country index φk 625 
 626 
 627 
Table 4: Scenarios for the energy security analysis 628 
S Description Country risk φk 
Corridor 
disruption 
S1 
Increased activity of 
terroristic groups in 
NA 
+15% 
Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Tunisia 
- 
S2 
Deterioration of the 
Italian/Qatari 
relations  
- 
Unavailability of 
all the Qatari LNG 
corridors (4) 
S3 
Antagonistic actions 
in Libya 
- 
Disruption of the 
NG Greenstream 
corridor (1) 
S4 
Increase in contrast 
between Russia and 
the Ukraine  
+10% 
 Russia, Ukraine 
Closure of the 
NG/Oil pipelines in 
the Ukraine (3 +1) 
S5 
Simultaneous 
Scenarios 1 + 4 
+15% 
Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Tunisia; 
+10% 
Russia, Ukraine 
Closure of NG/Oil 
pipelines in the 
Ukraine (3 +1) 
 629 
Table 5: Impact analysis for various scenarios, all commodities (reference 2014) 630 
  Total Supply 
 
Energy risk 
[TJ/y] 
Economic risk 
[G€/y] 
Percentage 
variation 
REF 3320988,0 848,9 - 
S1 3421496,4 874,6 + 3,03% 
S2 3402748,3 869,8 + 2,46% 
S3 3437896,7 878,7 + 3,52% 
S4 3609261,2 922,6 + 8,68% 
S5 3709769,6 948,2 + 11,70% 
 631 
 632 
 633 
Source Country φ Source Country φ
Algeria 44.7 Mexico 31.7
Angola 61.7 the Netherlands 10.5
Australia 12.5 Nigeria 48.0
Austria 22.0 Norway 0.4
Azerbaijan 43.9 Qatar 44.2
Belgium 25.8 Russia 34.0
Canada 9.9 Saudi Arabia 47.9
China 44.1 Slovenia 28.7
Colombia 39.9 South Africa 36.1
Congo 55.0 Spain 24.1
Egypt 47.0 Switzerland 22.8
France 23.0 Syria 52.5
Gabon 44.5 Thailand 40.1
Germany 12.3 Tunisia 44.7
Ghana 52.7 Turkey 41.8
Greece 30.2 Turkmenistan 52.3
India 38.3 the Ukraine 35.9
Indonesia 46.0 the UAE 43.1
Iran 50.4 the USA 5.9
Iraq 67.9 Venezuela 39.9
Kazakhstan 38.3
Kuwait 38.5
Libya 47.5
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Table 6: Impact analysis for various scenarios - only NG (reference 2014) 634 
  Natural Gas Supply 
 
Energy risk 
[TJ/y] 
Economic risk 
[G€/y] 
Percentage 
variation 
REF 1412834,3 361,1 - 
S1 1470743,8 375,9 + 4,10% 
S2 1494594,5 382,0 + 5,79% 
S3 1529742,9 391,0 + 8,27% 
S4 1643575,4 420,1 + 16,33% 
S5 1701484,9 434,9 + 20,40% 
 635 
Table 7: Monthly energy and economic risk variation for S1 636 
  
Energy risk 
[TJ\month] 
Economic risk 
[G€\month] % 
variation 
  REF S1 REF S1 
January 326301,9 335475,6 83,4 85,7 + 2,8% 
February 266461,9 275681,2 68,1 70,5 + 3,5% 
March 285720,8 292396,6 73,0 74,7 + 2,3% 
April 271453,4 280431,3 69,4 71,7 + 3,3% 
May 303996,6 313961,8 77,7 80,3 + 3,3% 
June 260970,7 267085,1 66,7 68,3 + 2,3% 
July 290410,6 297436,9 74,2 76,0 + 2,4% 
August 259432,6 268039,6 66,3 68,5 + 3,3% 
September 246424,2 255304,8 63,0 65,3 + 3,6% 
October 264644,3 271567,0 67,6 69,4 + 2,6% 
November 266992,5 276374,6 68,2 70,6 + 3,5% 
December 278178,6 287741,8 71,1 73,5 + 3,4% 
 637 
Table 8: Energy and economic risk variation for mitigation actions to S2  638 
  
Energy risk 
[TJ/y] 
Economic risk 
[G€/y] 
Percentage 
variation 
S2 3353434,3 857,2 - 
MA1-S2 3360660,8 859,0 -1,21% 
MA2-S2 3329944,1 851,2 -2,10% 
MA3-S2 3319985,2 848,6 -2,39% 
 639 
Table 9: Energy and economic risk variation for mitigation actions to S3  640 
  
Energy risk 
[TJ/y] 
Economic risk 
[G€/y] 
Percentage 
variation 
S3 3387423,0 865,8 - 
MA1-S3 3334651,4 852,4 -1,56% 
MA2-S3 3269333,4 835,7 -3,49% 
 641 
Table 10: Energy and economic risk variation for the S4 mitigation actions 642 
  
Energy risk 
[TJ/y] 
Economic risk 
[G€/y] 
Percentage 
variation 
S4 3555031,6 908,7 - 
MA1-S4 3203725,9 818,9 -9,88% 
MA2-S4 3196688,0 817,1 -10,08% 
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FIGURES 651 
 652 
 653 
 654 
 655 
Fig. 1 – “Fronts” and risk indexes in a national energy security assessment 656 
 657 
 658 
 659 
Fig. 2 – Polar representation of the geopolitical country index φk  660 
 661 
 662 
